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T HE Declaration of Policy in the Civil Aeronautics Act gives the
Civil Aeronautics Board a clear mandate to provide for "competi-
tion to the extent necessary to assure the sound development of an air
transportation system properly adapted to the needs of the foreign and
domestic commerce of the United States, of the Postal Service and of the
national defense." This policy admits neither of regulated monopoly
nor of unregulated competition. Congress was impressed both with the
need for some competition and the prevention of too much competition.
BACKGROUND
Before the Act was passed, a Federal Aviation Commission had
advocated to the 74th Congress (1935) "a certain measure of control
by the government of the right of entry into the business in order
that proper standards may be enforced and irresponsible campaigns of
mutual destruction on the part of operators averted." The Commission
was fearful that too many competitors on certain routes would ruin
the quality of the service. It said: "To allow half a dozen air lines to
eke out a hand-to-mouth existence where there is enough traffic to
support one really first-class service and one alone would be a piece
of folly.,"
During the hearings prior to passage of the Civil Aeronautics Act
practically every faction agreed that economic regulation was necessary.
Representatives of the principal airlines stressed the importance of
giving the existing lines "reasonable security" against "unwarranted
and unnecessary competition." They pointed out that capital was
badly needed at the time and unless capital was given some assurance
that it would be protected from over-building it would not be forth-
coming.
1 Report of the Federal Aviation Commission, 74th Congress, First Session,
Senate Document No. 15, pp. 52-61. -
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Another argument in favor of certification of all new lines was that
cutthroat competition might adversely affect safety standards. Thus
"regulated competition" was favored as the best policy for maintaining
high standards both from the economic and safety points of view.2
Certificates of public convenience and necessity have been required
for all scheduled commercial air services inaugurated since May 14,
1938. In a 1941 case, the Civil Aeronautics Board stated that four
questions should be considered in any application for new service:
1. Will the new service serve a useful public service, responsive to
a public need?
2. Can and will this service be served adequately by existing routes
or carriers?
3. Can the new service be served by the applicant without impair-
ing the operations of existing carriers contrary to the public
interest?
4. Will any cost of the proposed service to the government be out-
weighed by the benefit which will accrue to the public from the
new service ?s
In 1943 the Board was apparently expansionist-minded and in the
T.W.A., North-South California Service case said:
Since competition in itself presents an incentive to improved service
and technological development, there would be a strong, although
not conclusive, presumption in favor of competition on any route
which offered sufficient traffic to support competing services with-
out unreasonable increase of total operating cost.4
In 1944, however, it said:
The mere fact that a particular route develops a large volume of
traffic does not of itself afford sufficient justification for a finding
that the public convenience and necessity require establishment of
an additional competitive service exactly duplicating an existing
operation.5
Notwithstanding the Board's concern over duplication, the amount
of competition among the domestic airlines increased greatly between
1940 and 1948 as shown by the increased competitive service provided
between the leading fifty pairs of cities on the domestic air routes:
Service September 1940 September 1948
4-carriers None 3 pairs
3-carriers 3 pairs 16 pairs
2-carriers 8 pairs 22 pairs
single-carrier 39 pairs 9 pairs
Total 50 pairs 50 pairs
These fifty pairs of cities included most of the important air traffic-
generating centers and taken collectively they were producing from
one-third to one-half of the total domestic air line passenger-miles.6
2 Healy, Kent T., Economics of Transportation in America (1940) pp. 438-9.
3 2 C.A.B. 447 (1941) Delta Air Corporation, Service to Atlanta and Bir-
mingham.
4 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943).
5 6 C.A.B. 217 (1944).
6 Air Line Industry Investigation, Hearings before the Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate (1949) p. 750.
INTRODUCTION: EXTENT OF COMPETITION
During the "Air Line Industry Investigation" by the Senate Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce in 1949 and 1950, there
was pronounced criticism of the Board's liberal policy toward competi-
tive air services. Several airline executives ascribed the poor financial
condition of the industry to the excessive duplication and triplication
of routes resulting from overly liberal issuance of certificates of public
convenience and necessity. 7
By 1951 control of entry and restraints on expansion of existing
carriers' routes had been considerably tightened up. Far from its
earlier presumption in favor of competition, the Board said the Act
contained "no mandate to seek competition merely for the sake of
competition." Instead, to obtain a certificate in the particular case to
improve service which is not up to adequate standards. In a dissenting
opinion, Member Josh Lee objected, stating that such a requirement
"changes the policy of the Board from one that favors competition
wherever it can be justified to one that opposes it wherever its refusal
can be justified.""
THE PRESENT SITUATION
Expansion of the domestic air transport system has not stopped; it
has simply been slowed down. New route applications and changes in
existing certificate requirements are being considered by the Board
along with improvement of the air route pattern through mergers and
equipment interchanges. Service to the public is improving and at the
same time the air carrier industry is gaining economic strength.
By mid-1954 the domestic air transport system had expanded to a
record of 168,824 route miles with 37 certified carriers authorized to
serve a total of 654 cities. These included 14 trunk lines (including
Catalina Air Transport), 3 all-cargo carriers, 2 territorial carriers and
18 local service carriers (including 3 helicopter services). In addition,
various types of air services were temporarily authorized by the Board
through the exemption process. These included 55 irregular carriers,
1,391 air taxi operators, 1 non-certified Alaskan air carrier, and 53 air
freight forwarders.9 In its 1954 annual report to Congress, the Board
could report:
The fiscal year 1954 was a very favorable one for the air trans-
port industry from practically all aspects. Air travel continued to
increase, the financial outlook for the industry as a whole was good,
and overall dependence on government subsidy leveled off. These
favorable developments were achieved, furthermore, without any
compromise in airline safety .... The price per mile of air travel
in 1954 reached its lowest point in the past 5 years for both domes-
tic trunk line passengers and for international passengers.
7Ibid., Testimony of Messrs. Patterson, Smith and Rickenbacker, pp. 671, 742
and 1127. Doubtless they were disturbed by the fact that route mileage operatedby middle-sized and relatively small domestic trunk lines more than doubled from1938 to 1948 while that of the four largest systems increased only by approxi-
mately 16 per cent.
8 12 C.A.B. 518 (1951) Southern Service to the West.
9 Civil Aeronautics Board, Annual Report for the Fiscal Year Ending June
30, 1954.
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RESPONSIBILITIES OF CONTROLLED COMPETITION
The policy of "competition to the extent necessary" will require
constant reappraisal on the part of the Civil Aeronautics Board, for to
a large extent Congress has decided that the judgment of five men shall
supersede the natural economic law of the survival of the fittest.
Improvement of the economic position of the air carriers will prob-
ably bring pressure on the Board to be more liberal in granting certifi-
cates for new services. It will certainly permit the removal of certain
restrictions as to local or through service in the air route pattern. It
may allow for the eventual addition of new trunk line and local service
systems. It will certainly reduce the need of most air carriers for direct
subsidies over and above reasonable payments for air mail service.
Certainly one of the strongest arguments for continued restraints
on competition is the problem of safe traffic control. Available air
space around our most popular large city airports is shrinking and
pilots on the busiest air routes have lately been reporting a disturbing
number of "near misses" due to faulty vertical separation of aircraft.'0
We must not allow the excellent safety records of the past few years to
make us forget that even with the vast improvements in instruments,
safe air navigation still requires the wrapping of each plane "in an
ungainly cocoon of air because neither pilot nor controller can pin-
point the plane's position with sufficient accuracy to allow a narrower
margin.""
10 American Aviation, March 28, 1955.
11 Kilrain, Walter, discussing safety records of 1954 in American Aviation,
April 25, 1955.
